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T H E  A U S T R A L I A N  N AT I O N A L  U N I V E R S I T Y
In 1971, Antony Flew wrote:
Philosophy, as the word is understood here, is concerned !rst, last and all 
the time with argument. It is, incidentally, because most of what is labelled 
Eastern philosophy is not so concerned—rather than any reason of European 
parochialism—that this book draws no materials from any source east 
of Suez.1
$is passage appears in Flew’s Introduction to Western Philosophy. As the title 
suggests, this book is about Western philosophy. Given that this is the topic of his 
inquiry, there is perhaps no reason why he should venture into what is o%en labelled 
“Eastern philosophy”.2 However, rather than simply claiming that a study of Eastern 
philosophy is beyond the scope of his concern and leaving it at that, Flew assumed 
that philosophers “east of Suez” are not concerned with argument and took this 
assumption to license himself to disregard it.
Anyone who has even a slight knowledge of the history of Eastern philosophy, 
especially the philosophies that have developed in China and India, including 
Buddhist philosophy, would !nd Flew’s characterisation of Eastern philosophy 
amusing (to put it mildly). In China and India, debates have been a cornerstone 
of intellectual and socio-political activity. Indeed some Buddhist traditions still 
use debate as part of education to this day. Philosophical literature sprang out of 
highly detailed examinations of the techniques and methodologies of debate and 
argumentation. For instance, Indian Nyāya literature contains analyses of correct 
reasoning, Buddhist pramāṇavāda tradition investigates perception and inference 
as means to acquire knowledge, and the Chinese Mohist canon includes a study 
of correct judgements. Numerous texts can be cited which demonstrate that 
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philosophical literature in China and India is full of rigorous theorisation about 
arguments and rational reasoning.3
In fairness, it should be said that the understanding of Eastern philosophy assumed 
by Flew was based on a certain reconstruction of Indian philosophy that was popular 
at his time.4 $is reconstruction emphasised the possibility and importance of 
non-conceptual, purely perceptual experience and identi!ed rational thinking and 
argumentation as problematic. However, this view of Eastern philosophy—a view 
which is still common not just among the customers of New Age bookstores but also 
among philosophers—hardly represents the philosophies even of India, let alone 
the various philosophical traditions “east of Suez”. A more accurate representation 
of Eastern philosophy is now widely available (in fact, it was already available when 
Flew penned the problematic passage). Dismissal of Eastern philosophy along Flew’s 
line is, these days, considered to be intellectually dishonest.
$at said, some scholars have claimed that there is, strictly speaking, no tradition 
of studying logic in the East, or if there is, that it fails to match the sophistication 
achieved in the West.5 $at is, it is claimed that even though philosophers of the 
Eastern traditions have taken debates and argumentation as important to topics of 
philosophical inquiry, they have nevertheless failed to re+ect on and examine the 
principles that underly argumentation and rational reasoning. According to these 
scholars, argumentation has been put to use in elaborating on the nature of language, 
knowledge, reality and ethics; yet, there are no investigations of the principles 
underlying these modes of argument apart from the particular arguments that employ 
them. It is claimed that Eastern philosophers have not abstracted principles of 
reasoning and argumentation from particular instances and they have not formalised 
those principles in order to examine the features and properties of the principles. 
$is is o%en uni!ed in the idea that there is no development of formal logic in the 
East. As we will see, this has been taken to imply that there is no tradition of logic in 
the East.
In this paper, I will !rst show that there is, indeed, no development of formal logic in 
the East. However, I will argue that the lack of the development of formal logic does 
not entail the lack of the development of logic tout court. I will use this point to show 
how to undertake a cross-cultural dialogue between Eastern and Western logicians. 
My examination of the possibility of cross-cultural dialogue about logic will serve as 
a case study of showing how to do cross-cultural philosophy and how to use non-
Western materials as part of contemporary philosophy.
Formal Logic
$e contemporary Western literature on logic is largely based on the formal 
conception of logic. One way to articulate this conception is to say that logic and 
logical concepts are thought of as a concern with the ways that arguments or 
reasoning should “look”. Proposition logic is concerned with the propositional form 
of argument: A  B, A so B, where  is a conditional and A and B are propositional 
variables that stand for any propositions. Contemporary logicians take the forms such 
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as A  B, A so B as the object of study and delegate the question of what propositions 
A and B stand for as irrelevant. $ey investigate the systematic ways of separating 
those forms of argument that should be considered “valid” from those that are 
“invalid”. Valid forms are those where the truth of the premises (what appears before 
“so”) guarantees the truth of the conclusion (what appears a%er ‘”so”) no matter 
what propositions A and B stand for. For instance, the form: A  B, A so B, is o%en 
considered (though not by everyone)6 as valid because if we assume that A  B and 
A are true, B must also be true, no matter what A and B stand for. Predicate logic is 
concerned with quanti!ers and predicates involved in arguments. It is concerned with 
such forms of argument as: xPx (something is P) so xPx (everything is P) where 
P is a predicate. To elaborate on this form, assume that something (no matter what it 
is) is P. Does that assumption guarantee that everything is P? Not necessarily. We can 
imagine a situation with two objects a and b (again, the exact identity of these objects 
is irrelevant) where a is P (thus something is P) but b is not P (thus not everything is 
P). So many logicians consider this form of argument to be invalid.7
$e formal conception has led contemporary logicians to focus on the properties of 
formal languages that express the forms of argument. Instead of focusing on the forms 
of argument and reasoning expressed in natural languages such as English or Chinese 
or Sanskrit, they are concerned with the languages that consist of such terms as A, B 
(as propositions), , , , P (as a predicate) and a (as a proper name). $e focus of 
inquiry for contemporary logic concerns the nature of such languages. For instance: 
What sentences are expressible in a language consisting, for instance, only of , , 
P, a (and variables)? What expressible power would it give if we added   (necessity 
operator) to the language? What forms come out valid in what (formal) language?
Can we !nd studies of argument and questions like these in Eastern material? I think 
the answer is no. Many Chinese and Indian philosophers have investigated various 
features of argument and rational reasoning.8 However, we do not !nd in Eastern 
texts formal analyses of arguments and rational reasoning as articulated above nor 
do we !nd de!nitions of validity in terms of the form of arguments rather than their 
contents. $us, there is no development of formal logic in the East.9
Because of the lack of formal logic, some scholars have been led to think that there is 
no tradition of studying logic in the East. For instance, Hansen claims, “Technically, 
classical China had semantic theory but no logic”.10 By separating formal analysis 
of argument from the investigation of cognitive process and identifying cognitive 
process as the focus of Indian and Buddhist philosophers, Siderits argues that it is 
a mistake to think of them as engaging with a study of logic.11 More speci!cally about 
Buddhist “logic”, Gar!eld has this to say: “[‘Buddhist logic’] never reaches a level 
of sophistication that would lead us in the modern world to take it seriously as a 
sophisticated account of reasoning or of consequence relations in general”.12
I think that we can resist these conclusions. $e accounts of reasoning and 
argumentation that have been advanced by Eastern logicians should be taken 
seriously despite the fact that they did not develop a formal account of logic. I will 
also argue that the Eastern logic traditions can make important contributions to 
w
ay
s 
of
 d
oi
ng
 c
ro
ss
-c
ul
tu
ra
l 
ph
il
os
op
h
y 
!
 k
oj
i 
ta
na
ka
Australian Academy of the Humanities & Chinese Academy of Social Sciences62
the contemporary logic literature. Before explaining how to do so, however, I have 
to note that the dominance of formal conception in the Western logic literature 
constrains the methodology for studying the relevant Eastern literature.
Comparative Philosophy
If no formal study of arguments and rational reasoning is found in Eastern texts, 
it would seem that we cannot rely on the dominant comparative methodology for 
studying the logical concepts expressed by Eastern philosophers. A comparative 
method seeks equivalences and di1erences between Eastern and Western concepts.13 
It assumes that we can achieve an understanding of the philosophies of di1erent 
traditions in comparative terms based on the following methodological assumption: 
if one is already familiar with certain concepts in the Western tradition and wishes 
to understand the concepts made use of by Eastern philosophers or vice versa, one 
can grasp the “foreign” concepts by comparing them—!nding equivalences and 
di1erences—with the concepts one already has.
If examination of arguments based on their forms cannot be found in the Eastern 
texts, however, and the formal conception of logic provides the dominant paradigm 
in contemporary logic literature, this comparative method of investigating Eastern 
philosopher’s theorisation of logical principles cannot even get o1 the ground. 
$is is because no concepts expressed in Eastern texts pertain to formalised language 
expressing various forms and, thus, are unable to be recognised as logical concepts 
by the Western logicians.14 If this is right, a comparative philosopher would have to 
accept that the study of logic did not develop in the East and also accept the inference 
that the lack of formal logic entails the lack of logic tout court. It would thus seem 
that if we wish to conduct a legitimate investigation of logic material in the relevant 
Eastern literature, we would need to employ a di1erent methodology.
Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Logic
An alternative method of engaging with Eastern material on logic could be conceived 
as follows. Consider the early 20th century debate between Frege and Hilbert—two of 
the main !gures in modern logic—about consistency.15 $ey agree that consistency is 
a logical concept. $eir agreement about this fundamental logical concept, however, 
seems to end there. For Hilbert, consistency pertains to the formal structure that can 
be instantiated by anything including “tables, chairs and beer mugs”.16 From his point 
of view, consistency pertains to a formal system where a formal system is conceived as 
just a sca1olding without any material attached. It followed that a system of geometry 
can be shown to be consistent by showing that a system of numbers is consistent 
so long as the two systems share the same consistent sca1olding. Hilbert took this 
sca1olding to be what logical principles are about. Against Hilbert, Frege claims 
that the thought expressed by a geometric system is di1erent from that expressed by 
a number system. One is about geometric !gures whereas the other is about numbers. 
He argued that Hilbert owes us a justi!cation for the inference from the consistency 
of his number system (assuming that one can show this) to the consistency of the 
geometric system. For Frege, this requires 1) an analysis of concepts in a way that 
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brings out the complexity involved in the contents of the individual terms appearing 
in the system, and 2) a demonstration of the reducibility of one set of concepts and 
relations into another. $e consistency of a set of thoughts hinges not only on the 
sca1olding but also on the contents of the concepts and relations involved in the set 
of thoughts. For Frege, logical principles are concerned with the contents of concepts 
and not only with the sca1olding that can be !lled and used in many di1erent ways. 
Frege was thus arguing that the formal conception, at least in the way that it is 
articulated above, is not all there is to the !eld of logic.
Was Frege wrong to think that the formal conception alone should not de!ne the !eld 
of logic? $e in+uence of the Hilbert-style approach in the 20th and 21st centuries 
might suggest so. However, Hilbert was ultimately silent about why Frege was 
wrong.17 Nor has anyone a%er Hilbert demonstrated that logic is exclusively formal. 
In fact, it is an open question whether or not logical principles—the principles that 
underlie rational reasoning and argumentation—must be understood according to the 
formal conception in Western literature. $us, we cannot claim that the lack of formal 
analysis of argument is a sign of the lack of the development of logic without begging 
the question about what counts as a study of logic.
If this is right, the lack of formal analyses of arguments and reasoning and the lack of 
formal logic do not entail the lack of logic as such. Chinese and Indian philosophers 
investigate logical issues concerning good and bad argumentation and reasoning. 
$ey are concerned with such questions as: What follows from what? What counts 
as good reason? When is your reasoning warranted? $ey do not address these 
questions from a formal perspective. Instead, Chinese philosophers address these 
questions as part of investigating the cognitive processes of distinguishing similar 
from dissimilar kinds of things.18 Indian (and Buddhist) philosophers answer them by 
analysing the ways in which we acquire knowledge.19 $e fact that they do not address 
these questions from a formal perspective does not imply that they do not engage 
with logical concepts or that they do not study logic without the assumption that logic 
is exclusively formal.
In fact, if we pay attention to the di1erent perspectives from which Eastern 
philosophers address logical questions, we can develop a new approach to Eastern 
material on logic. Rather than comparing the ideas expressed by Eastern philosophers 
with what Western logicians know about logic, we can instead treat Eastern logic 
texts as sources of inspiration for a new perspective on contemporary philosophical 
issues. In dialogue with those Eastern texts which address logical issues from their 
own distinct perspectives, we can develop original solutions to contemporary 
issues based on the conceptual resources found in Eastern traditions. $is is like 
fusion cuisine enjoyed by the cosmopolitan citizens of the world. Fusion cuisine is 
not simply a juxtaposition of two or more cuisines but is genuinely novel fare that 
draws on di1erent culinary traditions. In a similar way, we can facilitate new ideas by 
drawing on and advancing arguments from both Eastern and Western philosophical 
traditions. $is approach makes the “cross-cultural” part of cross-cultural philosophy 
redundant. One might say that it is to do philosophy.
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If we were to adopt this new cross-cultural approach to philosophy, there is a 
possibility that we can uncover alternative conceptions of logic that have been 
neglected as a result of uncritically embracing the current, dominant Western 
view. For instance, Chinese logicians do not separate logical investigation from 
the cognitive process of discriminating this or that. Because of the focus on the act 
of discrimination, their logical investigation can be described as psychologistic.20 
$e psychologistic conception of logic has been discredited in modern times. 
$is is because a logical study is conceived as a study of rationality that some acts 
of reasoning may qualify. But, in order for reasoning to be the object of assessment, 
the standard for what counts as rational or irrational must be separate from the 
act of reasoning itself. $e formal conception of logic was developed partly to 
overcome the di2culty of accounting for rational reasoning because the process 
in which a reasoner goes through does not tell us whether the reasoning is rational 
or irrational. Instead of conceding that the Chinese investigation of the process of 
making discrimination falls outside the !eld of logic, however, we can develop an 
alternative conception of what counts as good reason based on the study of the way 
in which we discriminate similar from dissimilar things. Based on this alternative 
conception, we can then challenge the formal conception of logic that dominates 
contemporary Western literature.21 $is will not only contribute to the study of 
Chinese logic but, more importantly, expand the horizon of logical inquiry and enrich 
its analytical categories.
$ere is an extensive body of literature that examines the history of Western logic. 
Very few attempts have been made to integrate these historical and tradition-
speci!c investigations into a contemporary examination of the conceptions of 
logic that determine rational reasoning and argumentation. No one has drawn 
on non-Western resources to propose an alternative conception. No logicians 
trained in the Western logical tradition have attempted to undertake a thorough 
and comprehensible analysis of the various Eastern logic traditions and use them 
to examine critically the contemporary Western conception of logic. It is time that 
such a study of argumentation and logical reasoning is conducted from a cross-
cultural perspective. ¶
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